Dependency Confusion Scanner
Tests for dependency confusion attacks in package managers.
What is Dependency Confusion?
Dependency Confusion exploits package manager behavior where public repositories are checked alongside private ones. Attackers publish malicious packages on public registries (npm, PyPI) with the same names as internal private packages. When developers or CI systems install dependencies, they may fetch the malicious public package instead.
Why is This Important?
This attack compromised major companies including Apple, Microsoft, and PayPal during initial research. It exploits trust in package managers and the blurred line between public and private dependencies. A successful attack can achieve code execution on developer machines and in CI/CD pipelines.
How It Works
1. Attack Surface Mapping
Identifies complex attack vectors including race conditions, desync points, and logic flaws in your application.
2. Advanced Exploitation
Executes sophisticated attack techniques that bypass traditional security controls and detection mechanisms.
3. Impact Assessment
Demonstrates real-world impact with detailed exploitation chains and business risk analysis.
Key Capabilities
Expert-level security testing for sophisticated vulnerabilities that evade traditional scanning tools.
- Race condition and timing attack detection
- Request smuggling and desync analysis
- Business logic flaw identification
- Chained exploit development
- Protocol-level vulnerability testing
Frequently Asked Questions
How does dependency confusion work?
Organizations use internal packages named 'company-utils'. Attacker publishes 'company-utils' on public npm with a higher version. Package managers may prefer the public version due to version number or configuration. Installing fetches the attacker's code, which executes during install.
Which package managers are vulnerable?
Potentially vulnerable: npm (Node.js), pip (Python), gem (Ruby), NuGet (.NET), and others. Behavior varies by configuration. The issue isn't the package manager itself but how organizations configure private/public repository priority.
How do attackers find internal package names?
Discovery methods: JavaScript source code (import statements), package-lock.json in repositories, error messages leaking package names, documentation, job postings mentioning internal tools, and common naming patterns (company-name-auth, internal-utils).
How do I prevent dependency confusion?
Prevention: use namespace/scope for internal packages (@company/package), configure package manager to only use private registry for internal packages, use lockfiles that specify source, verify package source in CI/CD, and register your internal package names on public registries (as placeholders).
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